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Abstract - Wireless IDS architectural metrics are used to 
compare the intended scope, architecture of wireless IDS, and 
how they match the deployment architecture. These metrics 
can be used to evaluate the architectural efficiency of a 
wireless IDS and can help in designing efficient wireless IDS. 
Wireless IDS analyze wireless specific traffic including 
scanning for external users trying to connect to the network 
through access points and play important role in security to 
wireless network. Design of wireless IDS is a difficult task as 
wireless technology is advancing every day, Architectural 
metrics can play an important role in the design of wireless 
IDS by measuring the areas concern with the architecture of a 
wireless IDS. In this paper we describe a set of architectural 
metrics that are relevant to wireless IDS. A “scorecard” 
containing the set of values is used as the centerpiece of 
testing and evaluating a wireless IDS. Evaluation of a wireless 
IDS can be done by assigning score to various architectural 
metrics concern with wireless IDS. We apply our architectural 
metrics scorecard based evaluation approach to three popular 
wireless IDS Snort-wireless, AirDefense Guard, and Kismet. 
Finally we discuss the results and the opportunities for further 
work in this area. 
Keywords : Architectural Metrics, Wireless, Metrics, IDS, 
and Scorecard. 
I. Introduction 
new and exciting world has been opened by 
wireless. Its technology is advancing every day 
and its popularity is increasing. The biggest 
concern with wireless, however, has been its security, 
for some time wireless has had very poor, if any, security 
on a wide-open medium. Along with improved 
encryption schemes, a new solution to help combat this 
problem is the Wireless Intrusion Detection System 
(WIDS). An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a device 
or software application that monitors network and/or 
system activities for malicious activities or policy 
violations and produces reports to a Management 
Station (Wikipedia, 2012). A wireless IDS performs this 
exclusively for the wireless network. This system 
monitors traffic on network looking for threats and 
alerting personnel to respond. 
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Lord Kelvin said “If you cannot measure it, you 
cannot improve it”. This fact also applies to wireless 
network security issues. An activity cannot be managed 
if it cannot be measured, this is a widely accepted 
management principle and security falls under this 
rubric. Metrics can be an effective tool for security 
providers to discern the effectiveness of various 
components of their security programs. Metrics can play 
an important role in the designing of wireless IDS. 
Security Metrics that are related to wireless network are 
hard to generate because the discipline itself is still in 
the early stages of development. There is not yet a 
common vocabulary and not many documented best 
practices to follow [1]. 
This paper provides an architectural metrics 
scorecard based approach to evaluate Intrusion 
Detection Systems that are currently popular for wireless 
in the commercial sector. We describe a testing 
methodology we developed to evaluate wireless IDS by 
assigning score to various architectural metrics concern 
with it. The approach followed in this paper do not 
compare wireless IDS against each other, but against a 
set of architectural metrics concern with wireless IDS. 
The generalized approach of this paper will 
allow systems with any wireless requirements to tailor 
evaluation of ID technologies to their specific needs. 
Since evaluation is against a static set of architectural 
metrics the evaluation may be extended for other 
metrics like logistical metrics, performance metrics, 
quality metrics etc. The standard approach of 
comparison used in this paper also gives us scientific 
repeatability. 
II. Snort, Airdefense Guard and Kismet 
Wireless Ids 
In order to explain architectural metrics 
scorecard based evaluation approach to wireless IDS, 
we choose three wireless IDS namely Snort-wireless, 
AirDefense Guard, and Kismet as these are one of the 
most popular and works on different technology. 
a) Snort Wireless IDS 
Snort is an open source network intrusion 
detection and prevention system (IDS/IPS) that 
combines the benefits of signature, protocol, and 
anomaly-based inspection, and is the most widely 
A 
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deployed IDS/IPS technology worldwide. With millions of 
downloads Snort has become the de facto standard for 
IDS/IPS [4]. Snort-wireless allows for custom rules to be 
created based on framing information from a wireless 
packet. It also contains rules to attempt to find rogue 
access points, war drivers, and ad hoc networks. 
Snort-wireless works by implementing a 
detection engine that allows registering, warning, and 
responding to attacks previously defined. Snort-wireless 
is available under GPL (General Public License) and 
runs under Windows and GNU/Linux. It is among the 
most widely used, has a number of predefined 
signatures and continuously updated. Snort wireless 
can be configured in three modes namely sniffer, packet 
logger, and network intrusion detection. In addition to all 
of these basic Snort-wireless features, Snort-wireless 
can be set up to send real-time alerts. This provides with 
the ability to receive alerts in real time, rather than 
having to continuously monitor Snort system. Snort is 
like a vacuum that takes packets and allows to do 
different things. 
b) AirDefense Guard Wireless IDS 
AirDefense Guard is a wireless IDS that 
provides advanced intrusion detection for wireless LANs 
based on signature analysis, policy deviation, protocol 
assessment policy deviation and statistically anomalous 
behavior. AirDefense Guard is able to respond to 
attacks with Active Defense technology, which interfaces 
with the access points to disconnect the attackers 
connection to the WLAN. 
AirDefense can be used to identity theft. This is 
done by stealing an authorized MAC address, an 
intruder has full access to the network. However, 
AirDefense tracks the digital fingerprints vendor-specific 
characteristics and personal trademarks of authorized 
users to identify intruders in the network. AirDefense can 
be used to detect Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. 
AirDefense is able to quickly recognize the early signs 
and protocol abuses of a DoS attack that jams the 
airwaves and shuts down a wireless LAN. AirDefense 
can also be used to detect Man-in-the-Middle attacks. 
Posing as an access point, intruders can force 
workstations to disassociate from authorized access 
points and route all traffic through the intruder. The 
intruder can then gain access to the network by posing 
as an authorized user and simultaneously operating on 
multiple channels. AirDefense detects man-in-the-
middle attacks and ensure that access points only 
operate on set channels and proper protocols are used. 
c) Kismet Wireless IDS 
Kismet is an 802.11 layer2 wireless network 
detector, sniffer, and intrusion detection system. Kismet 
will works with any wireless card that supports raw 
monitoring mode, and can sniff 802.11b, 802.11a, 
802.11g, and 802.11n traffic. Kismet also supports 
plugins that allows sniffing other media such as DECT. 
Kismet identifies networks by passively collecting 
packets and detecting standard named networks, 
detecting hidden networks, and inferring the presence of 
nonbeaconing networks via data traffic [8]. Kismet 
wireless IDS without sending any loggable packets is 
able to detect the presence of both wireless access 
points and wireless clients, and associate them with 
each other. Unlike most other wireless network 
detectors. Kismet has the ability to log all sniffed 
packets and save them in a tcpdump /Wireshark or 
Airsnortcompatible fileformat. Kismet also captures PPI 
headers. Kismet also has the ability to detect default or 
"not configured" networks, probe requests, and 
determine what levels of wireless encryptions is used on 
a given access point. Kismet also supports logging of 
the geographical coordinates of the network if the input 
from a GPS receiver is additionally available [12]. 
III. Architectural Metrics Scorecard 
Based Approach 
a) Developing Scorecard 
Centerpiece of testing and evaluating wireless 
IDS will be a “scorecard” containing the set of 
architectural metrics and their definitions. Each metric 
can have low (+), average (++), or high (+++) score, 
where higher scores will be interpreted as more 
favorable ratings. 
The architectural metrics used are general 
characteristics that are relevant to architecture of a 
wireless IDS. The method used for observing each 
architectural metric value can be either analysis (source 
code analysis) or open source material (such as 
specifications, white papers or reviews provided by 
vendors or users). We use open source material to 
analyze each architectural metrics for wireless IDS. We 
examine publicly available research papers, reports, 
product documentation, published conference material 
(proceedings) and other material available for public 
review. 
b) Architectural Metrics for a Wireless IDS 
Architectural metrics are used to compare the 
intended scope and architecture of wireless IDS and 
how they match the deployment architecture. These 
metrics evaluate the architectural efficiency of a Wireless 
IDS [13]. The metrics defined in this area are shown in 
Table 1. Other Architectural metrics that may be 
included are: Anomaly Based, Autonomous Learning, 
Host/OS Security, Interoperability, Package Contents, 
Process Security, Signature Based, and Visibility [6]. 
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Table 1 : Selected architectural metrics for a wireless 
IDS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 : Scorecard for Snort wireless, AirDefense, and 
Kismet wireless IDS. + : Low score ; ++ : Average 
score ; +++ : High Score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2012 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
II 
 I
ss
ue
 X
I 
 V
er
sio
n 
I 
  
  
 
  
3
  
 
(
DDDD
)
E
Architectural 
Metrics 
Description 
Adjustable 
Sensitivity 
The difficulty of altering the sensitivity 
of a wireless IDS in order to achieve a 
balance between false positive and 
false negative error rates at various 
times and for different environments. 
Required Data 
Storage  
Capacity  
The amount of disk space needed to 
store logs and other application data. 
Load Balancing 
Scalability 
It measures the ability of a wireless 
IDS to partition traffic into 
independent, balanced sensor loads. 
Multiple Sensor 
Support 
The cardinality of sensors supported. 
Reordering and 
Stream 
Reassembly 
It can be used to find an attack that has 
been artificially fragmented and 
transmitted out of order. 
State Tracking This metric is useful in hardening 
wireless IDS against storms of random 
traffic used to confuse it. 
Data Pool 
Selectability 
This metric is used to define the data 
source to be analyzed for intrusions. 
System 
Throughput
Maximal data input rate that can be 
processed successfully by the wireless 
IDS.  
Architectural 
Metrics 
Snort 
wireless 
AirDefense 
Guard 
Kismet 
Adjustable 
Sensitivity +++ ++ ++ 
Required data 
Storage  
Capacity 
+ ++ +++ 
Load Balancing 
Scalability +++ +++ ++ 
Multiple Sensor 
Support +++ +++ +++ 
Reordering and 
Stream 
Reassembly 
+++ +++ +++ 
State Tracking  
+++ +++ +++ 
Data Pool 
Selectability +++ +++ +++ 
System 
Throughput +++ ++ ++ 
  
20
12
Ju
ne
c) Architectural Metrics Scorecard Based Approach
In this section we will apply above mentioned 
approach to popular wireless IDS Snort-wireless, 
AirDefense Guard, and Kismet. We choose these three 
for evaluation as they are one of the most widely used 
and have different ways of working. Below with table 2 
we describe how scores to architectural metrics related 
to these three wireless IDS are assigned.
Architectural metric Adjustable Sensitivity can 
be assigned score depending on the following criteria:
Low Score (+): No Adjustability.
Average Score (++): Adjustability via static methods.
High Score (+++): Intelligent, dynamic Adjustability.
Snort-wireless makes use of the SSL Dynamic 
Preprocessor (SSLPP), which decodes SSL and TLS 
traffic and optionally determines if and when Snort-
wireless should stop inspection of it. Encrypted traffic is 
ignored by Snort-wireless for both performance reasons 
and to reduce false positive and false negative error rate 
[15]. So, Snort-wireless gets a high score (+++) for 
metric adjustable sensitivity. Kismet wireless provides 
alerts based on fingerprints (specific nets tumbler 
versions). In an attempt to disclose the SSID of a 
network, Nets tumbler sends out unique packets. This is
not done in all situations, but when it is detected the
potential for false positives is very low [16]. So, kismet 
gets average score for metric adjustable sensitivity. As 
described in [17] Air defense guard delivered a false 
positive for a Nets tumbler scan that turned out to be 
one of test laptops pinging an AP. Air Defense
acknowledged that its Nets tumbler, signature needs 
some tweaking. So, it gets average score for metric 
adjustable sensitivity.
Architectural metric Required Data Storage 
Capacity can be assigned score depending on the 
following criteria:
Low Score (+): Large capacity storage needed 
to store log and other files.
Average Score (++): Medium capacity storage 
needed to store log and other files.
High Score (+++): Low capacity storage 
needed to store log and other files. Databases are used 
with Snort wireless to store log and alert data. Logging 
data to files in the disk is fine for smaller applications. 
However, keeping log data in disk files is not 
appropriate when there are multiple Snort-wireless 
sensors or there is need to keep historical data as well. 
Databases also allow to analyze data generated by
Snort-wireless sensors. Snort-wireless uses rules stored 
in text files that can be modified by a text editor. Rules 
are grouped in categories. Rules belonging to each 
category are stored in separate files. These files are then 
included in a main configuration file called snort.conf. 
Alerts are also stored in log files or databases where 
they can be viewed later on by security experts. Snort 
wireless needs a large database as its rules grows and 
gets a for this metric. Airdefense guard makes use of 
average data storage. Kismet wireless makes use of 
predefine rules and therefore needs less storage to 
store files. 
Architectural metric Load Balancing Scalability 
can be assigned score depending on the following 
criteria: 
Low Score (+): No load balancing scalability. 
Average Score (++): Low load balancing scalability. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
database is not strictly “real-time”. There is a
 
certain 
delay which depends upon frequency of uploading data
using SCP to the centralized database server. This
 
arrangement is shown in Figure 1 [7].
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 :
 
Distributed Snort-wireless installation with the
 help of tools like SCP and Barnyard [7]
 
 
Collaborative
 
Intelligence Architecture (DCIA), pioneered 
by Air
 
Defense, to
 
provide the most comprehensive 
wireless intrusion protection.
 
DCIA uses a dedicated 
network of sensors and embedded
 
client based agents 
that continuously monitor the airwaves and
 
wireless 
activity for attacks and policy violations. In addition,
 
the 
sensors use an intelligent channel scanning algorithm to
 
detect traffic across the RF spectrum. So, Air
 
Defense 
guard
 
also gets a +++ score. Like Snort-wireless and 
Air
 
defense
 
Kismet wireless also have a support to 
multiple sensors.
 
Architectural metric Reordering and Stream 
Reassembly can
 
be assigned score depending on the
 
following criteria:
 
Low Score (+): No capability to find an attack 
that has been
 
artificially fragmented and transmitted out 
of order.
 
Average Score (++): Very less capability to find 
an attack that
 
has been artificially fragmented and 
transmitted out of order.
 
High Score (+++): Highly capable to find an 
attack that has
 
been artificially fragmented and 
transmitted out of order.
 
The open source IDS Snort wireless implement 
target-based
 
analysis with the frag3 preprocessor. 
Frag3 is able to
 
reassemble overlapping fragments 
using the same policy as
 
the destination host. A user 
configures the IDS to apply
 
specific fragmentation
 
reassembly policies for individual hosts
 
or networks. 
Then, when the Snort sees overlapping
 
fragments 
bound for any of these hosts, it knows the
 
appropriate 
reassembly policy to apply—allowing both Snort
 
and the 
destination host to reassemble the fragments identically. 
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High Score (+++): Highly capable of 
partitioning traffic into independent, balanced sensor 
loads.
If the bandwidth being passed by the network 
interface associated with a Snort-wireless instance is 
greater than it can handle, more instances of Snort-
wireless can be launched and the traffic can be load 
balanced across the instances. An Adaptive load 
balancing architecture for snort is discussed in [18]. So, 
snort wireless gets a +++ score for this metric.
Motorola AirDefene guard wireless IDS clients 
use a sophisticated load-balancing algorithm when too 
many clients attempt to connect to a particular access 
point. The clients use a beacon element to perform pre-
emptive roaming and load balancing, thereby moving 
from a heavily loaded AP to one that is less loaded. 
Kismet wireless is not as capable as Snortwireless and 
AirDefense Gurad for load balancing scalability.
Architectural metric Multiple Sensor Support 
can be assigned score depending on the following 
criteria:
Low Score (+): Very less number of sensors 
supported.
Average Score (++): Average number of 
sensors supported.
High Score (+++): Large number of sensors 
supported.
A corporate environment probably have multiple 
locations and there is need to install Snort-wireless 
sensors. There are multiple ways to setup and install 
Snort-wireless in the enterprise as a distributed IDS. One 
method is to connect multiple sensors to the same 
centralized database. All data generated by these 
sensors is stored in the database. A user then uses a 
web browser to view this data and analyze it.
In an alternate mechanisms, Snort-wireless 
sensors do not have a direct connection to the database 
server. The sensors may be configured to log to local 
files. These files can then be uploaded to a centralized 
server on a periodic basis using utilities like SCP. The 
only problem with this approach is that the data in the 
Snort wireless gets a +++ score for this metric. 
The Air Defense solution is based on a Distributed 
Snort wireless gets a +++ score as it is able to find an 
attack that has been artificially fragmented and 
transmitted out of order. AirDefense Guard and Kismet 
wireless are also capable for out of order attaks. 
Architectural metric State Tracking can be 
assigned score depending on the following criteria: 
Low Score (+): No capability to detect storms 
of random traffic used to confuse wireless IDS. 
Average Score (++): Less capability to detect 
storms of random traffic used to confuse wireless IDS. 
High Score (+++): High capability to detect 
storms of random traffic used to confuse wireless IDS. 
Snort wireless gets a high score for metric state 
tracking as Snort wireless provides many configuration 
and command line options to detect storms of random 
traffic that can be specified in the snort configuration file. 
Table 3 describes such commands. AirDefense guard 
and Kismet wireless are also able to track state and gets 
a +++ score. 
Architectural metric Data Pool Selectability can 
be assigned score depending on the following criteria: 
Low Score (+): Poor capability to detect the 
data source to be analyzed for intrusion. 
Average Score (++): Average capability to 
detect the data source to be analyzed for intrusion. 
High Score (+++): Highly capable to detect 
the data source to be analyzed for intrusion 
Snort wireless gets a +++ score for metric 
data pool selectablity as Snort is a very complex pattern 
matcher geared toward detecting patterns of network 
attack traffic. On any 
Table 3 : Snort configuration commands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
given network, on any given day, Snort can fire 
thousands of alerts. Snort wireless makes use of ACID, 
SGUIL, SnortSnarf, Snort_stat.pl, Swatch tools to 
analyze intrusion data. AirDefense guard and kismet 
wireless like Snort-wireless are also able to properly 
select data pool. 
Architectural metric System Throughput can be 
assigned score depending on the following criteria: 
Low Score (+): Wireless IDS can successfully 
process less data input rate. 
Average Score (++): Wireless IDS can 
successfully process average data input rate. 
High Score (+++): Wireless IDS can 
successfully process high data input rate. 
If Snort has to work with a high speed 
connection, then there is need to use unified logging 
and a unified log reader such as barnyard. This allows 
Snort-wireless to log alerts in a binary form as fast as 
possible while another program performs the slow 
actions, such as writing to a database. AirDefense 
Guard and Kismet wireless process less data input rate 
as compare to snort wireless and both gets ++ score 
for the metric system throughput. Figure 2 shows score 
of Snort-wireless, Airdefense and Kismet IDS. 
IV. Conclusion and Future Work 
Unwanted activities on a wireless network can 
be detected by a wireless IDS. Architectural design of a 
wireless IDS is a difficult task as the technology of 
design of wireless network is changing at a pace which 
brings additional challenges in the design of wireless 
IDS. This paper provides an architectural metrics 
scorecard based approach that can be used for 
evaluating a wireless IDS in order to find out the areas in 
which wireless IDS is weak and needs improvement. 
Depending upon the requirements of the system these 
metrics me given priorities and appropriate wireless IDS 
may be selected after developing the scorecard. 
In this paper we define various architectural 
metrics concern with wireless IDS and a scorecard 
method to evaluate a wireless IDS by assigning scores 
to various architectural metrics. We use our evaluation 
methodology to test popular wireless IDS Snort-wireless, 
Air Defense Guard, and Kismet. This paper defines 
commonly used architectural metrics that are important 
to a wireless IDS, but a lot is required to be done to find 
out more ones like anomaly based, autonomous 
learning, Host/OS security, interoperability, package 
contents, process security, signature based, visibility 
etc. More architectural metrics and their definitions can 
be defined as lessons are learned while evaluating a 
wireless network. Future work also includes applying the 
evaluation methodology to other metrics concern with 
wireless IDS like logistical metrics, performance metrics, 
quality metrics etc. 
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Command  Description  
Enable_decode_
drops 
Enables the dropping of bad packets 
identified by decoder (only applicable 
in inline mode). 
Enable_tcpopt_e
xperimental_dro
ps 
Enables the dropping of bad packets 
with experimental TCP option. (only 
applicable in inline mode). 
Enable_tcpopt_o
bsolete_ 
Drops 
Enables the dropping of bad packets 
with obsolete TCP option. (only 
applicable in inline mode). 
Enable_tcpopt_tt
cp_drops 
Enables the dropping of bad packets 
with T/TCP option. (only applicable in 
inline mode). 
Enable_tcpopt_d
rops 
Enables the dropping of bad packets 
with bad/truncated TCP option (only 
applicable in inline mode). 
Enable_ipopt_dr
ops 
Enables the dropping of bad packets 
with bad/truncated IP options (only 
applicable in inline mode). 
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Figure 2 : Graph showing score of Snort-wireless, Air Defense and Kismet wireless IDS 
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